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Abstract: How does Mexico’s saving performance compare to the world’s?
Is Mexico ‘different’ ? Ard what drives Mexico’s saving behavior since the
1980s? This paper addresses these questions bringing together empirical
evidence from Mexico with that from a large cross-country time-series data
set on saving aggregates and their determinants. Using dynamic panel
data estimation techniques, the paper characterizes the major factors
behind world saving performance. In the light of this evidence, Mexico’s
saving experience is compared to the international benchmark. Further,
the paper turns to quarterly time-series evidence on saving in Mexico, and
examines the factors behind the observed evolution ofprivate and national
saving using a regression framework, with particular attention to the
isues ofinflation adjustment and Ricardian equivalence. Key variables in
Mexico’s saving performance have been the terms oftrade, public saving,
the real interest rate, and the inflation rate. Sustained future growth could
be reinforced by a virtuous saving-growth cycle, nurtured by the strong
response ofprivate (and national) saving rates to income growth observed
in the world sample.
Resumen: ¿Cómo se explica el desempeño del ahorro en México en com
paración con el mundo? ¿Acaso México es “diferente”? ¿Qué es lo que
conduce el comportamiento del ahorro en México desde los ochenta? Este
artículo se ocupa de estas cuestiones, estudiando series de tiempo de México
y el mundo sobre las tasas de ahorro y sus determinantes. El artículo
explica el desempeño del ahorro en el mundo usandotécnicas de estimación
de paneles dinámicos; y con esta evidencia se compara el desempeño del
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ahorro en México respecto del resto del mundo. Además se estudian series
de tiempo trimestrales sobre ahorro en México para ver los factores que
están detrás de la evolución observada en el ahorro privado y nacional, con
particular atención a los ajustes por inflación y a la Equivalencia ricardia
na. Las variables clave para explicar el ahorro en México son los términos
de intercambio, el ahorro público, la tasa de interés real y la tasa de in
flación. El crecimiento sostenido en un futuro podría ser reforzado por un
círculo virtuoso de ahorro-crecimiento, nutrido por la fuerte respuesta de las
tasas de ahorro privado (y nacional) al crecimiento del ingreso en la mues
tra mundial.
1. Introduction
Over the last three decades the world has witnessed an increasing
divergence in saving rates, particularly dramatic within the develop
ing world: saving rates have doubled in East Asia, stagnated in Latin
America, and fallen in sub-Saharan Africa. Mexico’s saving rate has
also experienced a boom-bust cycle: national saving (henceforth GNS)
climbed steadily during the 1970s to exceed 25 percent of gross
national disposable income (henceforth GNDI) in the early 1980s, and
then declined almostwithout interruption to around 15 percent ofGNDI
in the mid-1990s, a pattern that is key to the massive current account
deficits preceding the external crisis of 1994.
Why do saving rates vary so much across countries and over time?
Is Mexico ‘different’ in terms of saving behavior — i.e., can Mexico’s
experience be satisfactorily explained by the same factors relevant to
other countries’ saving? What accounts forthe large swings in Mexico’s
saving over the last two decadesjust mentioned aboye? This paper is
devoted to address these three questions.
In section 2 we tackle the first two questions by exploiting the
largest cross-country time-series macroeconomic data set on saving
and related variables assembled to date,’ adapting and extending
previous work by Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1998). There
we discuss the time-series pattern of saving in the world at large and
in Mexico over the last three decades. Then we report selective
econometric results for dynamic panel GMM-system regressions of
private and national saving rates for the full world sample and for the
1 A detailed description ofthe basic data set, including descriptive statistics and stylized
facts, is provided in López, Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1998).
set ofdeveloping countries. Our reduced-form specification comprises
a number ofdeterminants ofprivate (and national) saving in order to
establish the stylized facts concerning the effects of key policy and
non-policy variables identified in the literature. The applied estima
tion technique addresses issues ofsimultaneity and countryheteroge
neity that plague most earlier panel results. Then we atternpt to
explain the differences between Mexico’s and the world’s saving rates
by making use ofthe estimated equations.
Section 3 focuses on the behavior of saving in Mexico using
quarterly data from 1980 through mid 1995, expanding on previous
work by Burnside (1996, 1998). First, we discuss in sorne detail the
implications ofMexico’s high inflation for measured private and public
saving, and examine briefly the evolution of adjusted and unadjust
ed saving as well as key saving determinants. Next, we report simple
OLS regressions for private and national saving, using specifications
similar to those implemented on the world data. We then use these
regression results to re-examine the role of various saving determi
nants behind Mexico’s observed saving performance. Finally, section 4
concludes briefly.
2. Saving in Mexico and in the World
We begin with an overview of saving patterns across the world. The
data used here draws from the saving database recently constructed
at the World Bank. To our knowledge, such database represents the
largest macroeconomics data set on saving and related variables
presently available. It cornprises 150 countries and spans the years
1965-1994, and thus contains up to 4 500 annual observations. The
datahave been subject to extensive consistencychecks, and hence they
represent an important improvement in terrns of quality relative to
other existing data sets. For sorne of the key variables in this paper,
however, the effective coverage of the data is rnuch more lirnited,
particularly regarding the private (and public) saving measures de-
fined below. In addition from the basic data set we excluded a few
countries and or time observations that appeared clearly anomalous.
Private-sector saving and incorne measures are obtained resid
ually by subtracting the corresponding public-sector rneasures that
correspond to either the general governrnent (for most industrial
countries) or the consolidated non-financial sector inclusive of public
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enterprises (for most developing countries). In addition, public (pri
vate) saving is adjusted for the capital gains (losses) from inflation. 2
National (private) saving rates are defined as ratios to gross national
(gross private) disposable income.













The contrasting international patterns ofsaving over the last quarter
century are illustrated by Figure la, which presents gross national
saving rates for various country groups. To avoid the distortion caused
by time-varying country samples (as data for several smaller and
low-savingcountries become available onlyin the middle ofthe sample
period), the figure only reports information for those countries for
which data is available throughout the sample period. In addition, we
use medians rather than averages to mitigate the effects of outlying
observations on the regional aggregates; see López, Loayza, Schmidt
Hebbel and Servén (1998) for further details.
As Figure la shows, during the last 25 years saving rates have
risen to record-high levels in China and in a small group of Take-off
economies — a set ofdeveloping countries that achieved the transition
from low to high saving and growth, which includes seven East Asian
countries plus Chile and Mauritius. In contrast, median saving rates
stagnated in the other (lower-saving) developing countries, and de
clined steadily in the industrialized world.
Inturn, Figure lbprovides asimilarpicture interms ofgeographical
regions. The rising pattern of national saving rates in China and East
Asia (and, at a more modest level, South Asia as well) contrasts with
the trend decline in industrial countries and Sub-Saharan Africa,
and the boom-bust cycle in Middle Eastern countries (which include a
number ofoil-exporting economies) and Latin América.
How has Mexico fared relative to these international trends?
Figure 2a presents national saving rates in Mexico and selected world
regions. The figure shows large swings in Mexico’s national saving: a
period ofrelative stability up to the mid-1970s, during which Mexico’s
saving leveis were broadly similar to those in the rest of the Latin
2 For alternative public and private saving measures based on central-government saving
unadjusted for capital gains and losses due to inflation, as weIl as empirical results based on
them, see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and Servén (1998).
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Figure lb. GROSS NATIONAL SAVING RATES
BY WORLD REGIONS
Gross national saving rate net current transfers as percent
ofgross national disposable income
























American region; a steady increase considerably aboye the La
tin American (as well as the industrial-country) average until the
early 1980s; and a steep decline thereafter, to record lows in 1993-
1994, lower even than the median for Latin America. Mexico’s boom
bust cycle is qualitatively similar to, but oflarger magnitude and later
timing than the one observed in the Latin American region as a whole.
What is behind these swings in Mexico’s national saving? Fig
ure 2b provides an answer by presentingprivate saving rates (relative
to gross private disposable income GPDI) for Mexico and the same
regions as in the preceding figure. The similarity between the time
paths of Mexico’s private and national saving rates is apparent:
private saving hovered around 17-18 percent of GPDI until the late
1970s, rose to record highs in the early 1980s, far aboye the leveis
observed in the rest of Latin America, and collapsed after 1987 back
to leveis not different from those observed in LatinAmerica as a whole.
The boom-bust pattern of Mexico’s private saving, however, is
overstated by Figure 2b, whose underlying data are not adjusted for
the distorting effects of inflation. The latter magnifies the interest
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Saving in Mexico: The National and International Evidence
payments from the government on its debt heid by the private sector;
in an inflationary environment, part ofthese payments really are loan
amortization and do not represent real income for the recipient. As we
shall see later, ifthe inflationary component of interest payments is
subtracted from private saving (and added to public saving), the
boom-bust pattern becomes ofsmaller magnitude, but remains never
theless present: private saving rates rise to industrial-country leveis
in the early 1980s, and then drop to record lows. The private saving
fail after 1987, however, is limited to around 6 percentage points of
GPDI, rather thanthe nearly 20-point drop suggested bythe unadjusted
data. We shall return in Section 3 to the issue ofinflation adjustment
in the context ofthe Mexico savingdata; to avoidthe distortions caused
by high inflation, in the worldwide private saving regressions that we

















2.2. What Drives Saving Across the World?
To assess the factors behind these broad saving disparities across
countries and over time, we adopt an encompassing approach based
on reduced-form linear equations including a broad range of saving
determinants. Our regressors include a standard group ofincome-re
lated variables, namely the (log) level and the rate of growth of real
per capita income, and the terms of trade. To ensure cross-country
comparability of real income figures, we convert the local-currency
constant-price GNDI and GPDI data using World Bank Atlas exchange
rates averaged over 1965-1994.
in addition, our basic regressors include both price and quantity
financial variables. The latter are the ratio of M2 to GNP, as standard
indicator offinancial deepening, and the domestic (in national saving
equations) or private (in private saving regressions) credit flow rela
tive to income, to capture consumers’ access to borrowing. 3 The price
variable is the real interest rate, defined as ln [(1 + i)/(1 + it)], where
i is the nominal rate ofinterest and ir is the rate ofinflation.
As conventional, we attempt to capture Ricardian effects in pri
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Since stocks are typically measured at the end of the year, we compute our ratios to
income usingthe average ofthe current and previous year stocks (the latterhavingbeing brought
to current year prices). Flows are in turn obtained as differences of stocks for two consecutive
years.
The inflation rate is the average ofcurrent and one-period ahead inflation.
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vate savingequations by inciudingas regressorthe public savingratio,
measured in a way consistent with the definition of private saving
under consideration. In turn, demographic factors are reflected by the
oid and young-age dependency ratios, which are entered separately in
the equations, 5 and the proportion of urban population in the total.
Finaliy, we attempt to capture precautionary saving effects related to
macroeconornic uncertainty adding the inflation rate in (1 + it) among
the regressors. In this regard, we follow arathervoluminous literature
in which the inflation rate has been used as a proxy for price uncer
tainty (Deaton, 1977) and, more generally, macroeconomic instability
(e.g., Fischer, 1993).
The estimation procedure needs to tackle three issues. First,
ratherthan distortthe availableinformation byphase averagingusing
an arbitrary phase length (e.g., computing 5 or 10-year averages), we
choose to work with the original annual data in order to retain ah the
information. This in tum means that we need to use a dynamic
specification in order to allow for inertia, very likely to be present in
the annual information. Inertia in saving rates can arise from over
time (dynarnic) effects of the explanatory variables on saving, and
consideringit wiil allow us to discriminatebetween short-and long-run
effects on saving. 6 Second, sorne of the explanatory variables in the
core specification aboye are likely jointly determined with the saving
rate — e.g., the real interest rate, real income, and so on. Third, we
must also aliow for the possible presence of unobserved country-spe
cific effects correlated with the regressors. To address these issues,
our empirical analysis is based on Generalized-Method-of-Moments
estimators applied to dynamic panel data models, that control for
potential endogeneity of the explanatory variables and unobserved
country-specific effects. 7
Data availability vanes across countries, and thus we work with
an unbalanced panel. To achieve a minimurn time-series dirnension,
In the results reported below, the nuli of equality of their estimated coefficients was
generally rejected.
6 While seldom considered in empirical studies, saving inertia would follow directly from
e.g., consumption habits. In our sample, the first-order autocorrelation coefficient ofthe private
saving rate is 0.88.
The Generalized Method of Momenta (GMM) estimator was proposed by Chamberlain
(1984), Holtz-Eakin, Newey and Rosen (1988), and Arellano and Bond (1991). For a concise
presentation ofthe cizaaestimator applied to saving regressions see Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel and
Servén (1998). The resulta we present below were obtained using the system GMM estimator
proposed by Arellano and Boyer (1995) and Blundeil and Bond (1998).
as wehl as to reserve sufficient observations to irnplement the instru
mental-variable estimatorsjust described, we limit our sample cover
age to those countries with at least five consecutive annual observa
tions. Further, to avoid the distortions introduced by high inflation in
saving measures and related variables, we remove from the sample
those observations corresponding to high inflation episodes — specifi
cally, where inflation exceeds 50 percent. Unfortunately, these include
part ofthe 1980s in the case ofMexico. Finally, we also ehirninate those
observations where the real interest rate exceeds 50 percent in abso
lutevalue —an almost certain indication ofunderlyingdata problems.
After all these adjustments, the data set for the world sample (devel
oping-country sub-sample) comprises 848 (475) observations for 68
(49) countries in the case ofprivate saving, and 1 614 observations for 97
countries in the case ofnational saving.
With this setup, we performed a number of empirical experi
ments. Table 1 reports three representative estimation results: for
private saving in the world sample, private saving in the developing
country sub-sample (using in both cases inflation-adjusted private
saving, withthelatterdefinedconsistentlywiththe broadest available
definition of the public sector), and national saving in the world
sample. 8 The results are fairly robust across country samples (compar
ing columns 1 and 2) and across private and public-saving ratios
(comparing columns 1 and 3). We discuss them by variable categories
next.
Persistence. The lagged saving rate has a positive and significant
coefficient whose size (ranging frorn 0.38 to 0.57) reveals a large degree
of persistence. The pohicy implication is that the long-run effects of a
change in any policy (or structural) variable that affect saving are
approxirnately twice as large as their respective short-run effects,
given by the estimated coefficients reported in the table.
Income. Both the (log) level and the growth rate ofrealper capita
private disposable income have a positive and significant effect on
the private saving rate — as private agents become richer or their
incornes grow faster,their savingrate is bound to increase. The income
level result is consistent with models of subsistence consumption,
while the positive income growth effect runs against the permanent
8 The resulta are robust to the use of alternative private-sector definitions, estimation
techniques, country sub-samples, and addition ofexplanatory variables, as reported in Loayza,
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income hypothesis, but is consistentwiththe existence ofconsumption
habits andlorthe life-cycle model where income growth accrues mostly
across cohorts. According to the estimated coefficients, an increase in
incorne by 1 percentage point raises the long-run private saving rate
by approximately 0.15 percentage points, while an increase in the
growth rate ofincome by 1 percentage point raises the private saving
rate by similar amounts, ranging from 0.7 to 1.0 percentage points.
This strongeffectpoints toward a strongvirtuous cycle between saving
and growth. Policies that raise income levels or growth rates will also
have robust indirect effects on saving, that could feed back to higher
income leveis or growth effects. Lastly, a 1-percent improvernent in
the terms oftrade leads to an increase in the long-run private saving
rate by 0.08 to 0.20.
Financial Variables. The real interest rate has a negative impact
on the private saving rate in the world sample, suggesting that its
incorne effect outweighs the surn ofits substitution and human-wealth
effects: a 1-percentage point increase in the real interestrate produces
a long-run decline ofabout 0.64 percentage points inthe private saving
rate. This result should be taken with sorne caution, however, in view
of the strong negative correlation between inflation and the real
interest rate, which suggests that our real interest rate rneasure may
reflect more the action ofnominal interest rate controis than consum
ers’ intertemporal rate ofsubstitution. In fact, for the LDC sub-sample
the effect oftheinterestrate is zero and, while beingnegative, its effect
is not significantly different from zero for the world gross national
saving rate.
In turn, our indicator offinancial depth (M2/GNP) has a small and
statistically insignificant impact on private and national savingrates.
Finally, the flow ofprivate domestic credit relative to income carnes
a negative and significant coefficient, suggesting that the relaxation
of credit constraints leads to decreased saving (in agreernent with
evidence given by Japelli and Pagano 1995). When the flow ofprivate
(or domestic) credit rises by 1 percent ofincome, long-run private sav
ing rates decrease by 0.57-0.97 percentage points.
Liberalizing domestic financial intermediation typically involves
freeing interest rates, reducing bank reserve requirements, lifting
credit allocation requirernents on banks, and discontinuing the com
pulsory placement of government debt at below-market rates. As a
result offinancial liberalization real interest rates typically increase,
the banking sector grows, the size of outstanding monetary and
financial liabilities rises, and private (and dornestic) credit flows
expand. Theresults discussed aboyeprovide ableakerview offinancial
liberalizationthan suggested byprevious studies, in boththe price and
quantity dirnension. Higher interest rates either reduce or do not affect
saving — hence liberalized interest rates should definitely not be
expected to contribute to higher saving rates. In turn, the quantity
channel — activated by the relaxation of borrowing constraints —
shows a robust negative effect ofliberalization on saving. Finally, the
rise in monetary and financial-asset ratios to income caused by finan
cial liberalization is not significantly different from zero. Although on
the whole we do not find any positive, direct effect of financial liber
alization on saving, there is considerable evidence that financial
reform has a positive impact on growth (e.g., Levine, Loayza and Beck,
1998) and, throughthis channel, apotentiallyimportantindirect effect
on saving.
Fiscal Policy. A rise in the public saving ratio leads to a statisti
cally significant decline in the private saving rate. Specifically, an
increase of the public saving ratio by 1 percentage point reduces the
private savingrate by approximately one-quarter ofa point inthe short
run and by 0.45-0.77 ofa point in the long run. The former result is at
the low end ofprevious estirnates, while the latter is at the upper end
(see López, Loayza, Schrnidt-Hebbel and Servén, 1998), so that allow
ing for inertia in saving helps reconcile sorne conflicting estirnates
found in the literature.
In any case, our results fail well short of fuli Ricardian equiva
lence either in the short or the long run. The implication is that
public-sector saving is the rnost direct tool available to policy makers
targeting the level of national saving — but long-terrn effects are
weaker than short-term effects. For instance, a permanent rise in
public saving by 4 percent of GNDI will raise national saving by sorne
3 percent ofGNDIwithinthe year, but only by sorne 0.23 percent to 0.55
percent of GNDI in the long term.
Demographic Variables. Ml three dernographic variables under
consideration, narnely, the urbanization ratio and the young and old
dependencyratios, have a significantly negative irnpact on the private
saving rate. The negative effect of the urbanization ratio can be
explained along the precautionary-saving argument rnentioned ear
lier — lacking the means to diversify away the high uncertainty of
their rnostly agricultural income, rural residents tend to save a larger
proportion of their incorne. The negative coefficients on the depen














































































































dency ratios are consistent with standard life-cycie modeis of con
sumption. However, the coefficient on the oid dependency ratio is
significantly iarger than that on the young dependency ratio, possibly
reflecting the fact that in many countries the labor force effectiveiy
includes a non-negligible proportion of the popuiation aged under 16
(the cutoffpoint for the young dependency ratio).
Macroeconomic Uncertainty. Like in much of the recent growth
literature, in the core specification our proxy for macroeconomic un
certainty is the inflation rate. We find that a rise in inflation has a
positive coefficient, which suggests that increased macro uncertainty
(regarding for example nominal incomes, future policies and so on)
induces people to save a larger fraction oftheir income for precaution
ary motives. Conversely, a long-run reduction in the inflation rate by
10 percentage points reduces saving by 2.3 to 3.4 percentage points.
Regarding this result, it is important to keep in mmd the same
considerations made concerning the impact of financial reform: even
if the direct effect ofinflation stabiiization on private saving is nega
tive, stabilization also affects saving through other indirect channeis
that may well more than offset any negative direct effects of lower
inflation. In this regard, there is systematic evidence that inflation
raises growth (see Fischer, 1993, and Andrés and Hernando, 1997,
among others) and, as discussed aboye, the iatter has a major positive
effect on private saving. Further, the fiscal-adjustment component of
macro stabilization also has an unambiguously positive effect on





2.3. Is Mexico Different?
The empirical resultsjust reported summarize the saving behavior of
a large group of countries, and one may wonder to what extent they
are capable ofaccounting also for Mexico’s saving pattern. To provide
an answer, Table 2 reports a quantification of the factors behind the
observed discrepancy between Mexico’s private saving rates and those
ofthe remainingcountries. To facilitate comparabiity, we use the param
eter estimates from the LDC private saving regression in column 2 of
Table 1 aboye.
We perform the decomposition for three different samples. The
first one is just the fuli regression sample for which we have data on
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runs from 1978 to 1993, with a gap in the high-inflation period ofthe
mid 1980s. We next redo the exercise separately for the late 1970s-
early 1980s, when Mexico’s saving rates are near their peak, and
the early 1990s, when they reach their trough. We finally compare the
results from the latter two subsamples to checkwhether our empirical
model can account for the decline in Mexico’s private saving in the
1990s.
Column 1 presents the fuil-sample results. As the top ofthe colunm
indicates, Mexico’s private saving rate is, on average, 0.3 percentage
points aboye the LDC average (excluding Mexico). The remaining
entries along the column show the contribution of the different ex
planatory variables to this result. The main positive contribution is
that ofper capita income, higher in Mexico than in the LDC average;
ceteris paribus, this would account for an extra 12 points of private
saving rate. Inflation, through the precautionary saving effect, and
the terms oftrade also tend to raise Mexico’s private saving aboye the
leveis of the average developing country. In turn, the major negative
influences stem from the urbanization and young dependency ratios,
both higherthan average in Mexico; together, these two factors reduce
Mexico’s private saving rate by nearly 14 percentage points relative
to the LDC average. 9 The bottom of the column shows that all factors
considered, iftaken together, would raise Mexico’s private saving rate
2.5 percentage points aboye the LDC average, an over-prediction of2.2
points relative to the level actually observed. Since the estimated
equation includes fixed effects, this latter figure roughly reflects the
differential action ofunmeasured country-specific factors on Mexico’s
and other LDCS’ private saving performances.
Columns 2 and 3 perform a similar decomposition for the subpe
riods 1978-1982 and 1990-1993, respectively. In the former, Mexico’s
private saving rates are 2.2 percentage points aboye the LDC average,
while in thelatterperiod the situation is reversed and Mexico’sprivate
saving averages 2 points below the rest of LDCS. The estimated equa
tion captures fairly well the first subperiod, for which the predicted
difference in saving rates between Mexico and the other LDCS still
exceeds its observed counterpart, but only by 0.7 percentage points
(bottom of column 2). In the latter subperiod, however, the model
Notice that per capita income leveis and demographic and urbanization indicators are
al! very highly correlated, so that their combined effect (which in this case totals —1.0 percentage
points) could be viewed as reflecting the overail impact of’development’ on saving.
over-predicts Mexico’s saving performance relative to the LDC average
by a more substantial margin — 4 percentage points — even though
it correctly forecasts a decline.
As the last column in Table 2 shows, between the early 1980s and
early 1990s Mexico’s private savingratio declined byover 4 percentage
points relative to the LDC average. As implied by the previous para
graph, the estimated model predicts a more modest decline (0.9
percentage points, shown at the bottom of the column), but it is
nevertheless instructive to examine the factors behind such deterior
ation in saving performance, which are usted along the column. The
first remarkable fact is that the change in demographic indicators
between the first and second subperiods would instead predict a rise
in saving performance, reflecting the progress ofdemographic transi
tion in Mexico relative to other uzcs. These demographic forces would
ceterispan bus tend to raise Mexico’s private saving rate over the LDC
average by some 9 percentage points. An additional positive influence
is that of public saving, which declined in Mexico relative to the LDC
average. Through (partial) Ricardian offsetting, this would inturn add
another 2.6 percentage points to the difference between Mexico’s
private saving rate and the LDC average.
More interesting perhaps are the negative factors. The leading
one is the expansion in credit flows to the private sector, which would
account for a deterioration of over 4 percentage points in Mexico’s
private saving performance relative to the other developing countries.
This seems to agree well with the widely-held view that enhanced
credit availability (or, equivalently, the removal of borrowing con
straints) to the private sector triggered a spending boom in Mexico in
the early 1990s (see e.g., Montiel, 1998).
Apart from credit availability, several other factors contributed
ceterispan bus to a decline in Mexico’s differential saving performance
between the early 1980s and early 1990s: the reduction in inflation,
throughtheprecautionary saving effect; the deterioration intheterms
oftrade; the slowdown in growth and the decline inpercapita income,
in ah cases relative to the LDC average, ah exerted downward pressure
on Mexico’s private saving rate, again relative to the LDC average,
between the two subperiods considered.
On the whole, these results are reasonably satisfactory for an
empirical equation like the present one, estimated on a large cross
country time-series sample. However, while the estimated equation
helps single out sorne potential factors (notably the expansion of
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private credit flows) behind the decline in Mexico’s private saving
performance in the early 1990s, it fails to capture the fuil extent ofthe
decline. This suggests the need for a more in-depth analysis of
the Mexican experience. We turn to this task in the next section.
3. Saving in Mexico
In this section we explore Mexican quarterly time-series data from
1980 through 1995. We do this in three ways. First, we present charts
ofvarious measures ofprivate, public and national saving, along with
charts of a number ofpotential explanatory variables for private and
national saving. Second, we attempt to explain the behavior ofprivate
and national saving using regression analysis. The specifications we
use in the analysis are broadly consistent with those we used to
analyze the panel data set discussedin section 2. While ourregressions
do not have a fully structural interpretation, in the third stage ofour
analysis, we use them to assess the quantitative significance of
the various factors affecting aggregate saving in Mexico during this
period.’°
3.1. A Look at the Data
Figure 3 plots deseasonalizedquarterlytime series for Mexico over the
period 1980Q1-1995Q2. Several aspects of these time series are wor
thy ofnote. First, the national saving rate, SN, illustrated in Figure 3a,
follows the pattern already found earlier when using annual data in
Figure 2a:” it was fairly stable at around 23 percent ofGNP in the early
1980s, peaked in 1983 at almost over 25 percent of GNP, and then
declined slowly and fairly steadily from 1983 through 1994. It stood
at about 17 percent of GNP just prior to the peso crisis of December
10 While our regression specifications include dynamics for the saving rates we do not
attempt to determine the pattern ofcausality among the explanatory variables. In other words,
we do not identify mutually exogenous structural shocks that ultimately determine saving
behavior. See Burnside (1998) for a vector autoregression-based approach to identifying struc
tural shocks.
-
11 Because in this section we use quarterly data, the figures do not match exactly. An
appendix giving details ofour data is available upon request.
1994. So there is a decline of about 6 percentage points of GNP to be
explained over the sample period.
It may be instructive to examine the components of national
saving — that is, public and private saving. Public saving can be
viewed in turn as the sum of the public sector budget balance and
public sector investment, i.e., S 0 = + AG, where ‘G denotes public
sector investment and & is the public sector balance. From this
perspective, one factor in the decline in national saving may have been
the decline in public sector investment, il1ustrted in Figure 3b. It
peaked in 1982 at over 12 percent of GNP, and declined rapidly there
after in the wake ofthe debt crisis and the decline in world oil prices.
By 1994, public sector investment was only about 4 percent of GNP. Of
course, the extent to which public sector investment was responsible
for the decline in national saving depends on whether the decline in
this investment was offset by increased saving by the private sector.
The other component of public sector saving is the public sector
budget balance. To measure the budget balance we used data on the
financial balance, which includes the federal government, public sec
tor enterprises and public sector financial intermediaries in the defi
nition of the public sector. Detailed data on the finances of state
governments are not available for Mexico. Therefore, state govern
ments are implicitly excluded from the definition ofthe public sector.
The public sector financial balance as a percentage of GNP iS
illustrated in Figure 3c. There was a steady worsening of budget
deficits in the early 1980s as inflationaccelerated and nominalinterest
payments on debt soared. The deficit was almost always greater than
8 percent of GNP, from early 1986 through the first quarter of 1988.
After the implementation ofthe stabilization program in early 1988, the
budget deficit was gradually reduced, and the public sector actually
moved to a surplus position by 1990.
In Figure 3e we show public saving, defined as the sum ofpublic
investment and the public sectorfinancialbalance. The overali pattern
in public sector saving clearly resembles that of the public sector
budget balance. It declined steadily from about 10 percent of GNP ifl
the early 1980s, to almost —10 percent ofGNPjust prior to the imple
mentation of the stabilization program in 1988. It then rose steadily
to remain mostly aboye 5 percent of GNP in the 1990s. Thus we see an
8-year long decline in public sector saving of about 20 percentage
points of GNP followed by a similar rise in public sector saving ofabout
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Since national saving displays no swings of such magnitudes, it
is clear that our measure ofprivate sector saving,S, which is obtained
residually from the identity, S = SN
—S 0 , will reflect them. This is
illustrated in Figure 3g. There is an apparent increase in private sector
saving from about 10 percent of GNP in 1980 to about 25 percent of GNP
in 1987-1988, followed by a decline to the 10-15 percent of GNP range in
the 1990s.
Taken at face value, the fact that private saving and public sector
saving seem to move roughly opposite to one another is quite sugges
tive of Ricardian equivalence, i.e. the hypothesis that publie sector
finance is offset by the saving decisions ofthe private sector. However,
it is important not to take the data at face value. The public sector
budget balance figures, which are the basis of our measures ofpublic
and private sector saving, are dominated, during the 1980-1988
period, by large nominal interest flows. Figure 4e illustrates the annual
ized inflation rate during our sample period. A clear negative correla
tion between the inflation rate and the budget balance is apparent.
This means that we need to think carefully about how we should
take interest flows into account in our measures of saving. Suppose a
household has a net worth of 1 peso, held in the form of government
debt, at time t, and receives interest on that debt at date t + 1, in the
amount i. Everything else heid equal, the household’s net worth at
date t + 1 will be 1 + i. However, the purchasing power of the house
hold’s wealth will be given by (1 + i)/(1 + it), where it is the inflation
rate between the two time periods. Ifwe were to measure household
saving in the same manner as we measured public and private saving
aboye, then in this example it would be i, or in real terms, i/(1 + it),
where we have normalized the time t price level to 1. But ifwe were
to measure the household’s real saving using the change in the
purchasing power ofits net worth, we would have real saving equal to
(1 + i)/(1 + it) — 1 = (i — it)/(1 + it), or nominal saving equalto i — it. The
lesson from this example is that whenever the public sector has a
substantial stock of nominal debt outstanding, the first method of
measuring saving will tend to overstate effective private saving by the
inflation rate times the stock of debt. And there will be an equal and
opposite understatement of public sector saving.
Since inflation was rapid, and the Mexican government had
substantial nominal debt in the 1980s, this discussion is clearly
relevant for our analysis. In our subsequent analysis we will use an
inflation-adjusted measure of the public-sector financial balance, u
lustrated in Figure 3d, and given by’ 2
= AGt + itB_ 1 ,
where it is the rate ofinflation ofthe GDP deflator, andB corresponds
to the end-of-period t peso value of the consolidated domestic public
debt (economica amplia) published by the Bank of Mexico in the
Informe Anual. This measure of the public debt considers the public
sector to be the federal government, parastatal organizations and
enterprises, plus official financial intermediaries, and thus corre
sponds to the definition of the public sector used to construct the
financial balance. We make symmetric adjustments to our measures
of public saving,S =S + ,t B -1’ and private saving,S = SN
—
illustrated in Figures 3fand 3h, respectively.
There arethree possible problemswith ourinflation adjustments.
First, if sorne domestic currency debt is held by foreigners then the
inflation adjustment should be applied to national saving (assuming
that the national accounts do not already make the inflation adjust
ment). Second, adjustments should only be made for debt whose face
value is fixed un nominal terms. No adjustment would be required
for indexed debt. And finally, similar adjustments should be made for
foreign debt whenever there are departures from purchasing power
parity. Since we did not have data on foreignholdings ofdomestic debt,
detailed information of debt indexation, nor information regarding
holdings offoreign assets byhouseholds, we chose not to attemptthese
further adjustments.
Figures 3d, 3f and 3h show that the inflation adjustments are
important. They remove the strong swings in saving that are an
artifact oflarge nominal interest flows. However, the strong negative
correlation between public sector and private saving remains. In this
case, it seems to arise from the fact that our adjustments for inflation
have induced a great deal ofhigh frequency movement in public sector
saving. Since similar movements in national saving are not observed,
these high frequencymovements end up beingreflected in ourresidual
measure of private saving. We investigate the possibility that these
high frequency movements reflect measurement error below.
‘ 2 ’fle cross-cbuntry data behind the regressions in section 2 aboye is adjusted forinflation
following a very similar procedure.
204 205Craig Burnside, Klaus Schmidt-Hebbel y Luis Servén Saving in Mexico: The National and Internatioaal Evidence
3.2. Empirical Specification
This subsectionpresents results ofregressions that seek to explainthe
variation in saving rates we saw in the previous section. The specifi
cations we will use in the analysis strongly resemble those we used in
Section 2 to describe saving patterns worldwide. One important dif
ference is that we do not use any ofthe dernographicvariables because
we do not have high frequency measures for thern.
There are also sorne differences regardingeconometricprocedure.
The GMMtechnique adopted inthe previous sectionwas used primarily
to deal with the problem of estimating fixed-effects using a dynarnic
panel data set. Suppose we wish to estirnate the relationship
=a 1+py 1 +x (3 +
where i denotes the country and t denotes the time period, andç are
assumed to be serially uncorrelated. A standard procedure for handi
ing fixed effects in the context ofpanel data involves first-differencing
equation (3.1) to obtain
(3.2)
The GMMprocedure used inthe previous section is designedto handile
the fact that by íirst-differencing to eliminate fixed effects, correlation
between a regressor,zy 1 , and the error term, t ç, is induced. The
procedure also allows forpossible correlationbetweenx andç, byassum
mg that ç is orthogonal to ah variables determined in period t — 1,
or earlier. The OMM procedure uses any variable dated t —2, or earlier, as
an instrument for the right-hand side variables m (3.2).13
When we move to studying Mexican data we no longer have to
deal with fixed effects so we can work with an equation expressed
in levels
y=a+py 1 +x í3+e.
13 Actually, the system OMM technique used in the previous section is a bit more
complicated in that it combines the first-differenced equation (3.2,, using lagged levels of the
variables as instruments, with the original leveis equation (3.1), using lagged differences oftheva
riables as instruments. See Blundeli and Bond (1998) for further details.
Under the same assumptions as we used in the panel analysis
aboye, the only reason we might need to use a GMM-based procedure is
to handie possible correlation betweenx and e. In our regressions we
proceed without using an instrumental variables procedure, and
simply use OLS. We attempted regressions using lagged explanatory
variables as instruments, and in most cases obtained similar but
noisier point estimates for most ofthe variables, but in other cases the
instruments appeared to be insufficiently correlatedwiththe explana
tory variables to obtain accurate estimates.
3.3. Dependent and Explanatory Variables
In our regressions we attempt to explain movements in the private
saving rate, as well as the national saving rate. We define the pri
vate saving rate to be given by private saving, S;, divided by private
income, Y,,, where our measure of private income is obtained as the
sum of private saving and the national accounts measure of private
consumption, C. We define the national saving rate as the ratio
ofnational saving, SN, to GNP.
As aboye, we include the lagged saving rate as an explanatory
variable in order to capture possible lagged responses of saving rates
to various shocks.
In our panel regressions we included the level of real per capita
income along with its growth rate. This is effectiveiy the same as
including the level of income as well as its lagged value in the
regression. The income variables used in this section are the growth
rate of real per capita private income, in the regression for private
saving, and the growth rate of real per capita GNP, in the regression
for national saving. We use growth rates rather than incorne levels,
because there appear to be unit roots, if not trends, in the levels of
thesevariables in our sample period (see Table 3). We only include the
contemporaneous growth rate of income in the regressions because
lags of the growth rate were never significant when they were in
cluded. The growth rate ofrealper capita GNP is plotted in Figure 4a.
As in Section 2, we includéd the ex-post real interest rate as an
explanatory variable. This was measured using the nominal interest
rate on Mexican treasury bilis reported bythe International Financial
Statistics, and using the inflation rate defined by the annualized
quarterly inflation rate of the GDP deflator. This real interest rate
(3.1)
(3.3)






































































measure is plotted in Figure 4b. There are three main episodes of
noteworthy fluctuation in real interest rates. The post-debt crisis
period and the pre-stabilization period were both periods offinancial
repression and large negative real interest rates. The immediate
post-stabilization period was one of very large positive real interest
rates.
As in Section 2, we included measures ofboth M2 relative to GNP
and domestic credit relative to GNP.’ 4 These variables are illustrated
in Figure 4c. They are highly correlated with one another, and so, at
least for Mexico it will be difficult to separately identify coefficients on
the twovariables as measures offinancial depth and credit availability
respectively.
The terms oftrade defined as the ratio ofthe export price deflator
to the import price deflator is included in ourregressions. This variable
is illustrated in Figure 4d. Not surprisingly, given Mexico’s position
as a signiflcant oil exporter, its terms of trade are highly correlated
with the world price ofcrude oil defined as the dollar price of a barrél
of crude oil relative to the US GDP deflator. The simple correlation
between the two time-series is 0.87. For this reason, we can think of
the terms of trade as largely reflecting exogenous external shocks to
Mexico’s national wealth.
In our benchmark regressions we include public sector saving,
scaled by either private income or GNP, as an explanatory variable. In
the regression for private savingthis allows us to determine the extent
to which private saving offsets public saving. To the extentthat it does,
the coefficient on public saving should be close to —1. In the regression
for national saving, if private saving offsets public saving, the coeffi
cient on public saving should be close to 0.15
Finally, as in Section 2, we include the inflationrate as a measure
ofmacroeconomic instability. We use the annualized rate ofinflation of
the GDP deflator as our measure, illustrated in Figure 4e.
Movingbeyond ourbenchmark speciflcations, we explorethe data
further to see whether there are systematically different effects on
private saving arising from changes in the two components of public CI)
C12
14 We use private domestic credit in the private savings regression and total domestic
credit in the national savings regression.
The defrnitions ofseveral variables change slightly (because they are scaled differently)
when we move from the private saving to the national saving regressions. This, along with
inclusion of the iagged saving rates, explains the fact that the coefficients on variables other
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saving: the budget balance and public sector investment. To explore
this issue we include these two variables (scaled relative to private
income or GNP) in our regressions instead ofpublic saving.
A further departure from our benchmark specifications arises
when we include public sector consumption, expressed relative to
private income or GNP, in our regressions. We do this for the following
reason. Suppose the public sector budget is initially in balance, and
the government increases government consumption by 1 peso and fi-
nances it in the short-term by borrowing. This shows up as a decline
in the budget balance and in public saving. In a Ricardian world, the
increased budget deficit will have an offsetting effect on private sav
ing, but the increase in government consumption will also have mdi
rect effects depending on consumers’ preferences regarding public
sector consumption. In a different experiment, ifthe deficit increases
due to a temporary cut in lump-sum taxation, only the direct effect
will come into play. These examples suggest that we should include
government consumption as a control variable. It is illustrated in
Figure 4f.
3.4. Regression Results
Table 4 presents the regressionresults forprivate savingwhile Table 5
presents the results for national saving. The results are broadly
consistent with our findings using the worldwide database.
In Table 4 column 1 we present our benchmark private saving
regression which is most comparable to our regressions in section.
First, we find little serial correlation in private saving from the pure
feedbackterm. The coefficient ofthe laggeddependentvariable is close
to zero and is insignificant. We found larger feedback terms in our
worldwide analysis.’ 6
Second, we find that income growth has a negligible positive
impact on saving rates. While the sign ofthe point estimate is consist
ent with our worldwide findings, it is not statistically or economically
significant. A 10 percentage-point increase in the growth rate of
income would result in an increase in savingofabout 0.3 ofone percent
of income.
16 The lack of feedback in these data may be function ofhigh frequency measurement
error in the dependent variable as discussed in section 3.1 and below.
Table 4. Regressions for Private Saving in Mexico
1 2 3 4
Lagged saving rate 0.084 0.086 0.090 0.16
(0.97) (1.01) (1.09) (2.13)
Private income growth 0.029 0.027 0.022 0.086
(0.38) (0.35) (0.30) (1.29)
Real interest rate 0.11 0.11 0.13 0.12
(2.67) (2.77) (3.20) (3.52)
M2/GNP -0.05
(0.44)
Termsoftrade 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.18
(5.40) (6.77) (6.01) (7.50)
Public saving rate —0.66 —0.66
(9.20) (9.27)
Public budget balance —0.64 —0.58
(9.20) (9.06)
Public investment —0.90 —0.69
(6.53) (5.17)
Private domestic credit 0.006 —0.03 —0.04 0.17
(0.05) (0.44) (0.52) (2.07)
Inflation rate 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.13
(5.55) (5.58) (6.08) (6.72)
Public consumption —0.97
(3.96)
R 2 0.80 0.80 0.81 0.86
Note: The dependent variable is the private saving rate measured as the ratio ofprivate saving
to private income. The private income growth rate is expressed as the first difference of the
logarithm of real per capita income. The real interest rate is expressed as the logarithm of
(1 + i)/(1 + it). The terms oftrade is expressed as its logarithm. Public saving, the public budget
balance, public investment, public consumption and private domestic credit are ah expressed
relative to private income. The inflation rate is expressed as the logarithm of(1 + it). The sample
is 1980Q2-1995Q2. T-statistics are in parentheses.
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Table 5. Regressions for National Saving in Mexico
1 2 3 4 5
Lagged saving rate 0.56 0.56 0.53 0.49 0.48
(5.01) (5.00) (4.62) (5.13) (5.15)
GNP growth 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.16 0.19
(1.63) (1.65) (1.23) (1.65) (1.94)
Real interest rate 0.050 0.054 0.063 0.052 0.055
(1.88) (2.06) (2.33) (2.30) (2.58)
M2JGNP —0.07
(0.97)
Terms oftrade 0.051 0.041 0.064 0.091 0.096
(2.74) (2.66) (2.74) (4.55) (4.94)





Public investment —0.07 —0.029 0.10
(—0.50) (0.27) (0.73)
Domestic credit 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.18 0.22
(1.43) (1.07) (0.75) (3.29) (3.67)
Inflation rate 0.058 0.058 0.067 0.067 0.069
(3.57) (3.58) (3.82) (4.65) (4.86)





R 2 0.80 0.79 0.80 0.87 0.87
Note: The dependent variable is the national savingratameasured as the ratio ofnational saving
to GNP. The GNP growth rate is expressed as the first difference ofthe logarithm ofrealper capita
GNP. The real interest rate is expressed as the logarithm of (1 + i)/(1 + it). The terms oftrade is
expressed as its logarithm. Public saving, the public budget and primary balances, public
investment, public consumption and domestic credit are ah expressed relative to GNP. The
inflation rate is expressed as the logarithm of(1 ÷ it). The sample is 198OQ2-1995Q2 T-statistics
are in parentheses.
Unlike in our worldwide regressions, in Mexico higher real inter
est rates are associated with higher saving rates. A 100 basis-point
increase in the real interest rate would result in an increase in private
saving of about 0.1 of one percent of income. This seems like a small
magnitude, until one takes into account the fact that there have been
enormous swings in real interest rates in Mexico. For example, in 1988
the real interest rate rose by about 7 000 basis-points from —30 percent
to +40 percent.
The level ofM2 relative to GNP as a measure offinancial develop
ment is insignificant in the regression as it was in our cross-country
analysis. Similarly, our measure ofprivate domestic credit relative to
private income is also insignificant. A possible explanation for this
finding is that in our Mexican data, domestic creditis highly correlated
with one of our other explanatory variables that has a closer high
frequency relationship with private saving.
The terms oftrade has a strongpositive relationship with private
saving, consistent with our findings aboye. A 10 percent decline in the
terms of trade would cause private saving to fali by 1.3 percent of
income. In our sample period, oil prices felisteadilyand Mexico’sterms
oftrade deteriorated by about 45 percent, implying roughly a 6 percent
decline in private saving. Why should private saving fali when the
terms oftrade worsen? When oil prices fail, iftheir decline is perceived
to be transitory, there will be a decline in income, but the perceived de
cline in permanent income, and thus, the decline in private consump
tion will be much smaller. Thus saving rates will fail.
The higherthe public saving rate the lower is private saving. The
degree of offset is about two-thirds, consistent with Bosworth (1996),
although somewhat larger in magnitude than the long-run estimate
that we found in our worldwide sample.
Finally, higher inflation appears to be associated with higher
saving, consistent with ourfindings aboye. An increase in the inflation
rate of 10 percentage points causes a rise in saving of just over 1
percent ofincome. There are two plausible explanations ofthis behav
ior. First, periods ofhigh inflation tend to be periods ofmacroeconomic
uncertainty, so households and firms may save more simply for pre
cautionary reasons. Second, higher inflation acts as a tax on consump
tion purchases financed with cash balances, so households may be
postponing consumption and saving in indexed or real assets when
inflation is high.
We get similar results when we consider the benchmark national
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saving regression in Table 5 column 1. A key difference that arises is
that there is more persistence in the national saving rate. The feed
back coefficient is 0.56 and is highly significant. Furthermore, real GNP
growth has a more robustly positive impact on saving both in terms of
its magnitude and in terms of its statistical significance. The real
interest rate, terms oftrade and inflation effects are ah similartowhat
they are in the private saving regression once we take the feedback
coefficient into account. Consistent with the findings from the private
saving regressionwe findthat an increase in public sectorsavingtends
to raise the national saving rate by about 0.09 ofone percent of GNP in
the short run, or about 0.2 of one percent of GNP in the longer run.’ 7
Inturn, the level ofdomestic creditrelative to GNP appears to have
a marginally significant positive impact on saving.
From these regressions we proceed to alternative specifications.
Our first step was to remove one of the financial variables from the
regression. We chose to eliminate M2/GNP as a regressor and use only
domestic credit in the regressions. The resulting estimates are pre
sented in column 2 of Tables 4 and 5. The estimates remain roughly
unchanged, and domestic credit remains either insignificant or mar
ginally so.
As we discussed aboye, it may be important to separate public
saving into its two components. The private sector might react quite
differently in its decision making to an increase in public saving due
to increased public investment, as opposed to an increase driven by,
say, higher taxes. So in column 3 ofTables 4 and 5 we present results
obtained by separately entering the public sector budget balance and
the rate of public investment. In both cases, the coefficients on other
variables remain qualitatively unchanged. The offset coefficient on
public investment is closer to —1, which suggests public investment is
a close substitute to private saving. We tested whether the coefficients
on the budget balance and public investment were the same using
simple Wald tests. We unambiguously rejected the hypothesis of
equality in the private saving regression. However, the hypothesis can
only be rejected at the 40 percent level in the national saving regres
sion.
Finally we added public sector consumption to our regressions for
the reasons given aboye. The results are presented in column 4 of
Tables 4 and 5. In the private saving regression this caused the offset
r This implies an offset coefficient of—OS.
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coefficients on public investment and the budget balance to be of
roughly similar magnitude (—0.69 and —0.58 respectively) and made
domestic credit a significant —but positively signed — right-hand side
variable. It also raised the estimate ofpersistence in the saving rate.
Interestingly, higher pubhic sector consumption appears to cause a
decline in private saving of equal magnitude. This finding extends to
the national saving regression. What is the explanation? One possibil
ity is that public consumption has no effect on the marginal utility of
private consumption. In such case, a temporary, tax-financed increase
in public consumption (that is, holding public saving constant) has
little effect on private consumption but will cause private income to
fali one for one. This would cause a decline in both private and national
saving. However, permanent increases in public consumption, sorne
thing our data appear not to exhibit, would cause private consumption
to fall and would have a much smaller impact on saving.
3.5. What Is Important for Explaining Saving in Mexico?
In this subsection we examine our regression results more closely. For
this purpose we take our column 4 regressions as benchmark. We
consider the fit of these regressions in Figure 5. Our regressions
capture a great deal of the variation in saving rates. There is almost
no evidence ofserial correlation in the residuals. The first order serial
correlation coefficient for the error term in the private saving regres
sion is 0.2, while in the national saving regression it is about —0.1.
In Figure 6 we decompose the explained departures ofthe private
saving rate from its mean into its various components. Each graph
indicates how much of the deviation is explained by the departure
ofeach variable from its own mean. An important caveat to this sort of
analysis is that it does not identify structural causahity. For example,
thinking ofmovements in the inflation rate that occur independently
of movements in real interest rates may not make sense if the two
cornove strongly. For this reason we also present the correlation
matrix of the explanatory variables in the private saving regression
in Table 6. Finally, it is also important to keep in mmdthat the exercise
under consideration here is different from that undertaken in sec
tion 2: there the objective was to explain Mexico’s differential perform
ance vis-?x-vis the rest of the developing world, while here we are
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Subject to these considerations, the important determinants of
private saving appear to be:
1. Real interest rates (Figure 6b). The fact that these were espe
cially low in the debt crisis and pre-stabilization periods would appear
to have lowered private saving rates by about 3 percentage points
below its average level. The relatively high real interest rates in the
post-stabilization period are associated with significantly higher sav
ing rates. But it is important to keep in mmd that the movements in
real interest rates we are referring to were enormous. In a relatively
stable economic environment, where we would not expect wildfluctua
tions in real interest rates, they would not have a large impact on
private saving.
2. The terms oftrade (Figure 6c). The decline in oil prices and its
terms oftrade that Mexico experienced from 1981 through early 1987
would have caused a dramatic decline in private saving of about
15 percentage points according to our estimates. As the terms oftrade
improved gradually in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the terms of
trade effect roughly disappeared.
3. Publio saving: thepublic sectorbudgetbalance (Figure 6d). Our
data include quite sharp high frequency swings in the public sector
deficit. Given the large offset coefficients we estimated, private saving
moved sharply in several episodes (Figure 6d).
4. Publio saving: public sector investment (Figure 6e). Interest
ingly there is a sharp increase in private saving ofabout 6 percentage
points implied by the decline in public investment that occurred in the
early 1980s.
5. Inflation (Figure 6g). The inflation rate was much higher in
Mexico in the 1982-1988 period than before or after. Higher inflation
appears to be robustly associated with higher saving. In fact, ifthere
is a decline in private saving in the late 1980s and early 1990s to be
accounted for, the decline in inflation rates appears to be the main
explanation. The return to macroeconomic stability until 1995 may
have caused the private sector to reduce its precautionary balances,
and to raise consumption due to a reduction in the inflation tax.
Why do we need to be cautious in conducting this one-variable
at-a-time analysis? To take an example, Table 6 indicates that the
inflation rate is not highly correlated with any variable other than
the real interest rate. So when we consider the effects ofhigh inflation
on private saving, we need to note that real interest rates typically
fali sharply during periods of high inflation, due to financial repres
sion. To find the overali effect of inflation on saving we need to look
simultaneously at Figures 6b and 6g. Similarly, public investment is
strongly negatively correlated with the terms oftrade. Ifpublic invest
ment is financed out of discretionary funds obtained through oil
revenues, we mightwant to think ofoil shocks as causingthe combined
outcomes ofFigures 6c and 6e.
In Figure 7 and Table 7 we perform a similar analysis using our
regression for national saving. Here the main determinants ofsaving
appear to be:
1. Real Interest Rates and Inflation (Figures 7b and 7g).
2. The Terms ofTrade (Figure 7c).
3. Domestic Credit and Publio Sector Consumption (Figures 7f
and 7h). Variation in these variables appears to have had a moderate
impact on saving rates.
3.6. Measurement Error and Budget Deficits
The results in Tables 5 and 6 consistently suggest that private saving
behavior offsets, at least to a large degree, the budgetary policies of
the public sector in the 1980s and early 1990s in Mexico. However, as
we have noted aboye, there is a strong possibility that this result is
driven by measurement error.
For example, suppose our measure of national saving is correct,
but that the measured budget balance, A”, is subject to a white-noise
classical measurement error. This will imply that A” = + E, where
A; is the true budget balance and is a white noise error term uncorre
lated with A; and with national saving. Since national saving is assumed
to be measured correctly, in a simple regression ofnational saving on
the budget balance the coefficient estimate would be given by
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where f3* is the true coefficient. The noisier the budget balance data
are, the further the coefficient estimate will be biased towards zero.
A similar argument explains how the offset coefficient in the private
saving regression may be biased toward —1.
Are our data corrupted with measurement error? It is effectively
impossible for us to determine whether they are, without an inde
pendent measure of private saving or the governrnent’s inflation—ad
justed budget balance. Our estimates ofthe offset coefficients are not
that different from those presented by Bosworth (1996), who worked
with annual data over a different sample period. Since our inflation
adjustrnents are the most likely source ofmeasurement error and his
were based on official Mexican data, we are inclined tohave sorne faith
in our estimates.
Finally, again because our inflation adjustments are the most
likely source of measurement error, we performed an additional re
gression which is presented in Table 5, column 5. In this regression
we simplyeliminate interestpayments from ourrneasure ofthebudget
balance by using the primary balance. We again obtain an estimate
which implies substantial offset of public saving behavior by the
private sector.
As a final word of caution, it should be pointed out that the
regressions cannot truly be given a structural interpretation. They
describe a simple relationship among the variables, and they do not
identify the responses of private or national saving to exogenous
shocks to the Mexican economy. Most ofthe right-hand side variables
in the equations could easily be thought of as simultaneously deter
mined by a large number of comrnon structural shocks. Burnside
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4. Conclusions
We started this paper by making use of the largest cross-country
time-series macroeconomic data set on saving and related variables
assembled to date to discuss the time-series pattern of saving in the
world at large and in Mexico over the last three decades. A simple
comparison shows that boom-bust saving cycles were more pro
nounced in Mexico than in other Latin American countries during the
last three decades. Selective econometric results for dynamic panel
GMM-system regressions of private and national saving rates for the
fullworld sample and for the set ofdevelopingcountries werereported.
The results helped identify the stylized facts concerning the effects of
key policy and non-policy variables in explaining saving across the
world.
Then we attempted to explain the differences between Mexico’s
and the world saving rates by rnaking use ofthe estirnated equations.
While the estimated equation helps single out sorne potential factors
behind the decline in Mexico’s private saving performance in the early
1990s, it fails to capture the full extent ofthe decline, suggesting the
need for a more in-depth analysis of the Mexican experience. We
turned to this task in three stages.
First, we noted the importance of adjusting for inflation the Me
xican saving data. While this correction to saving data needs to be made
quite generally (and has been implemented in our worldwide data
base), in the case of Mexico it is particularly irnportant due to the
high-inflation environment of the 1980s, that distorts considerably
the unadjusted public and private saving figures and causes them to
display strong swings that are largely artificial.
We next reported simple OLS regressions for private and national
saving using specifications analogous to those estimated on the world
sample. The results — which should be interpreted as reflecting
association rather than strict causation arnong the different variables
— are ingeneral fairly similar to those obtained with the cross-country
data. We find a significant positive association ofprivate saving with
theterms oftrade and inflation, and a negative associationwith public
saving. In contrast with our panel regressions, however, we also find
a signiflcant positive effect ofthe real interest rate, although ofsmall
magnitude, while the effects ofcredit availability and income growth
are insignificant in the Mexican data. Finally, regressions with na
tional saving as the dependent variable yield very similar results. On
the whole, our estimated equations do a goodjob at accounting for the
observed variation in saving ratios.
Using these estimates, we concluded by examining again the
contribution ofdifferent factors to the observed time pattern ofprivate
saving in Mexico. From this analysis, we identified as key variables
the terms of trade, public saving, the real interest rate, and the
inflation rate.
Income growth had a small and insignificant effect on Mexico’s
private saving rate during 1980-1995 — a result that might be attnb
uted to low and noisy growth in Mexico during this particular sample
period. But from the strong contribution ofper capita income level and
growth rates to saving rates in the world, docurnented in this paper,
one may be optimistic about Mexico’s future saving rates. If the
country is able to sustain a high growth path in the future, this path
could be reinforced by a virtuous saving-growth cycle, nurtured by the
strong response of private (and national) saving rates to real income
growth observed in the world sarnple.
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